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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge. 
 
This tax case presents two questions. First, are"delay 
damages," received by the plaintiff in a personal injury tort 
action pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 
238, exempt from federal income taxation as damages 
"received on account of " a personal injury? 26 U.S.C. 
S 104(a)(2). Second, if delay damages are taxable, how 
should their amount be determined when the plaintiff has 
agreed to a post-verdict settlement that fails to allocate the 
recovery between compensation for the injury and delay 
damages? 
 
We hold that the personal injury exemption of 26 U.S.C. 
S 104(a)(2) does not extend to "delay damages" under 
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 and thus the 
recovery of those damages by taxpayers is taxable. While we 
acknowledge the practical difficulty of determining delay 
damages when they are subsumed as an unidentified 
component of a comprehensive settlement agreement, we 
nonetheless conclude that the District Court reasonably 
found delay damages to be an element of the settlement at 
issue in this case. We therefore affirm its judgment. 
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I. FACTS 
 
Charles Francisco and his wife Cecilia (collectively, the 
"Taxpayers") brought an action in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Philadelphia County to recover damages for 
personal injuries Mr. Francisco sustained in a 1983 
automobile accident.1 In March 1994, a jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Taxpayers -- awarding Mr. Francisco 
$1,810,000 in damages and Mrs. Francisco $100,000 for 
loss of consortium. Delay damages in the amount of 
$1,615,662 were then added to that award2  by the court 
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238, 
resulting in a total judgment in favor of the taxpayers of 
$3,525,662.3 The defendants in the personal injury action 
appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which 
affirmed the trial court's judgment in July 1995. 
 
While the defendants' petition to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court for allowance of appeal was pending, the 
parties agreed to and executed a Settlement Agreement and 
Release (the "Settlement Agreement") on January 19, 1996. 
The Settlement Agreement provided for payment to the 
Taxpayers of $3,400,000 in exchange for releasing the 
defendants from liability. It contained no admission of 
liability and was entered "for the sole purpose of avoiding 
further costly litigation." Taxpayers' counsel later submitted 
an affidavit to the District Court in this action explaining 
that neither the payment of "prejudgment interest" nor the 
tax consequences of the settlement was considered during 
settlement negotiations. Instead, he suggested that the 
verdicts "were considered only for the purpose of 
establishing the dollar exposure around which negotiations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The facts of this case are undisputed and are taken from the 
Stipulation of Uncontested Material Facts agreed by the parties before 
the District Court. 
 
2. Delay damages were awarded on Mr. Francisco's personal injury 
award and not the loss of consortium claim. Under Pennsylvania law, 
delay damages are not available for loss of consortium. See Anchorstar 
v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 620 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Pa. 1993). 
 
3. The Stipulation of Uncontested Material Facts appears to have 
excluded Mrs. Francisco's consortium award in its calculation of the 
"total award" of $3,425,662. 
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with defendants centered. No specific part of the verdicts 
was considered in establishing interest as a component of 
the settlement." After attorneys' fees and costs were 
subtracted, the Taxpayers received $2,247,727. 
 
The Taxpayers did not include any of the $3,400,000 
settlement as income on their 1996 tax return. The Internal 
Revenue Service (the "IRS") audited the Taxpayers and 
assessed a tax deficiency of $402,646.4  The deficiency was 
calculated by first determining what component of the net 
settlement recovery represented delay damages. The IRS 
assumed that 46% of the recovery was taxable as delay 
damages because 46% was the same ratio of delay damages 
($1,615,662) to the total award ($3,526,462) awarded to the 
Taxpayers in court. It then multiplied the net recovery of 
the Taxpayers ($2,247,727) by 46% and concluded that 
$1,033,954 of the settlement was taxable as delay 
damages. The IRS assessed a deficiency of $402,646 on the 
$1,033,954 in taxable income received by the Taxpayers. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
The Taxpayers paid the deficiency, with interest, and 
then filed a timely claim with the IRS for a refund on March 
17, 1998. See 26 U.S.C. S 6511(a). The IRS denied their 
administrative claim and Taxpayers brought this refund 
suit against the Government in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Because the 
suit was filed within two years of the IRS's denial of their 
claim, it was timely. See 26 U.S.C. S 6532(a)(1). Jurisdiction 
in the District Court was proper pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
S 7422(a) and 28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(1). 
 
On June 22, 1999, the District Court ruled that delay 
damages were taxable and granted part of the 
Government's motion for summary judgment. The Court 
declined to address what portion of the settlement should 
be properly allocated to delay damages and requested 
further briefing on the subject. On May 25, 2000, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Though Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 has been in effect 
since 1979, we know of no prior case in which the IRS has sought to tax 
delay damages received under this Rule. 
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District Court granted final judgment in favor of the 
Government after concluding that the IRS's method of 
apportioning the delay damages was proper. 
 
This Court has jurisdiction over the Taxpayers' timely 
appeal of both rulings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The 
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Government is entitled to plenary review by this Court. See 
Greenberg v. United States, 46 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
III. TAXABILITY OF DELAY DAMAGES 
 
A. 
 
Gross income is defined for purposes of the Internal 
Revenue Code (the "Code") in 26 U.S.C. S 61. That section 
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, 
gross income means all income from whatever source 
derived." 26 U.S.C. S 61(a). The statute provides an 
illustrative list of various sources of income. One example 
is "(4) Interest." 26 U.S.C. S 61(a)(4). The Supreme Court 
has long acknowledged the comprehensiveness of defining 
income in this manner. "The broad sweep of this language 
indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full measure 
of its taxing power . . . ." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 
334 (1940); see also Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 
348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955) ("The definition of gross income 
has been simplified, but no effect upon its present broad 
scope was intended."). Given the breadth of S 61, it is 
undoubtedly true that the Taxpayers' recovery is gross 
income under this definition and they do not argue 
otherwise. This Court has held that "any accession to 
wealth is presumed to be gross income, unless the taxpayer 
can demonstrate that the accession fits into one of the 
specific exclusions created by other sections of the" Code. 
Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 657-58 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429-30). The 
question is how much of the Taxpayers' increase in wealth 
is specifically exempted from income by other provisions of 
the Code. 
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Taxpayers assert that the entire proceeds of the 
settlement are exempt from income under the personal 
injury exemption, 26 U.S.C. S 104(a)(2). In 1996, that 
exception excluded from taxation "the amount of any 
damages (whether by suit or agreement and whether as 
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal 
injuries or sickness." Id. The Supreme Court has noted that 
the effect of the broad construction of S 61's definition of 
gross income is that "exclusions from income must be 
narrowly construed." United States v. Burke , 504 U.S. 229, 
248 (1992). For that reason, courts interpreting the 
personal injury exception have required a two-part showing 
by taxpayers. "First the taxpayer must demonstrate that 
the underlying cause of action giving rise to the recovery is 
`based upon tort or tort type rights'; and second, the 
taxpayer must show that the damages were received`on 
account of personal injuries or sickness.' " Commissioner v. 
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337 (1995). 
 
It is undisputed that Taxpayers' underlying jury award 
was for a tort or tort type rights and that those damages 
were received on account of personal injury. "For damages 
to be excludable under section 104(a)(2), the taxpayer's 
underlying claim must be for tortlike personal injury." 
Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124, 127 (1993) (citing 
Burke, 504 U.S. at 233). We are presented with the more 
exacting questions of whether delay damages added to the 
underlying award by the Pennsylvania court pursuant to 
Rule 238 are "based upon tort or tort type rights" and 
whether they were received "on account of " a personal 
injury. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337. Resolution of these 
questions requires us to examine the genesis ofS 104(a)(2). 
 
The principle underlying S 104(a)(2) is known as the 
"human capital" rationale. As recently explained in O'Gilvie 
v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84 (1996), it has its roots in 
several early tax opinions of the Supreme Court 
establishing "the principle that a restoration of capital was 
not income." Id.; see Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 
179, 187 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 
335 (1918). The statute that eventually became S 104(a)(2) 
resulted from an extension of the restoration of capital 
principle to personal injuries. As an Opinion of the Attorney 
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General described it, a recovery for personal injury"merely 
take[s] the place of capital in human ability which was 
destroyed by the accident." 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 304, 308 
(1918) (cited in O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 85). This 
replenishment of human capital, in the form of damages, 
"aim[s] to substitute for a victim's physical or personal well- 
being -- personal assets that the Government does not tax 
and would not have taxed had the victim not lost them." 
O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86. The Supreme Court recently 
emphasized the importance of fidelity to the human capital 
rationale, the "original moorings" of S 104(a)(2). "This 
history and the approach it reflects suggest there is no 
strong reason for trying to interpret the statute's language 
to reach beyond those damages that, making up for a loss, 
seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely, 
`return the victim's personal or financial capital.' " Id. 
 
Obviously, we cannot determine whether delay damages 
make a victim whole or return the victim's personal or 
financial capital without understanding the purpose served 
by delay damages under Pennsylvania law. This is not to 
say, however, that we are deciding an issue of state law. 
While Pennsylvania law describes the character of the legal 
right to delay damages, the tax consequences of the 
Taxpayers' receipt of delay damages are governed solely by 
federal law, in this case the considerations underlying 
S 104(a)(2).5 See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 162 
(1942); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938). "A court 
therefore must look first to state law to ascertain the 
existence and nature of the interests [the IRS wishes to 
tax]. While state law creates legal interests and defines their 
incidents, `the ultimate question whether an interest thus 
created and defined falls within a category stated by a 
Federal statute requires an interpretation of that statute, 
which is a Federal question.' " 21 W. Lancaster Corp. v. 
Main Line Rest., Inc., 790 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(applying this principle to IRS tax liens) (citations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because the role of state law in this inquiry is merely to describe the 
nature of the interest being taxed, and because we believe the nature of 
the interest created by Rule 238 to be settled in Pennsylvania law, we 
decline the Taxpayers' invitation to certify questions to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. See 210 Pa. Code S 63.10. 
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Having recognized the function state law serves in 
informing our judgment, we proceed to discuss the nature 
of delay damages under Pennsylvania law. 
 
B. 
 
To ascertain the character of delay damages awarded 
pursuant to Rule 238, we must begin with a discussion of 
prejudgment interest in Pennsylvania common law. 
Traditionally, prejudgment interest, also called"interest eo 
nomine,"6 was only available when a fixed or liquidated sum 
was due on a certain date. See Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, 
L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 395 (3d Cir. 2000). "Interest, as such, 
is recoverable only where there is a failure to pay a 
liquidated sum, due at a fixed day, and the debtor is in 
absolute default." Citizens' Natural Gas Co. v. Richards, 18 
A. 600 (Pa. 1889). In these contractual cases, prejudgment 
interest "is a matter of right and is calculated from the time 
the money becomes due or payable." American Enka Co. v. 
Wicaco Mach. Corp., 686 F.2d 1050, 1056 (3d Cir. 1982); 
see also Penneys v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 183 A.2d 544, 
546 (Pa. 1962) (citing Restatement (First) of Contracts 
S 337); Palmgreen v. Palmer's Garage, 117 A.2d 721, 722 
(Pa. 1955); Frank B. Bozzo, Inc. v. Electric Weld Div. of Fort 
Pitt Div. of Spang Indus., Inc., 498 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985). 
 
Yet Pennsylvania law did not completely deny to tort 
victims a remedy for the passage of time. In Citizens' 
Natural Gas Co. v. Richards, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court established that in some property tort cases, such as 
"unintentional conversion or destruction of property," 
prejudgment interest may be awarded. 18 A. at 600. The 
Court explained: 
 
       Into these cases the element of time may enter as an 
       important factor, and the plaintiff will not be fully 
       compensated unless he receive not only the value of 
       his property, but receive it, as nearly as may be, as of 
       the date of his loss. Hence it is that the jury may allow 
       additional damages in the nature of interest for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The English translation is "interest under that name." 
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       lapse of time. It is never interest as such, nor as a 
       matter of right, but compensation for the delay, of 
       which the rate of interest affords the fair legal measure. 
 
Id. The award of such "compensation for delay" in property 
torts "is not a matter of right but is an issue for the finder 
of fact, the resolution of which depends upon all the 
circumstances of the case." Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi 
Bottling Co., 263 A.2d 336, 337 (Pa. 1970); see also 
American Enka Co., 686 F.2d at 1056. Under either theory, 
"interest" or "compensation for delay," the plaintiff was 
compensated at the statutory legal rate of interest of six 
percent from the date the cause of action accrued. See 
American Enka Co., 686 F.2d at 1057; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
41, S 202 (2000). 
 
However, neither prejudgment interest nor "compensation 
for delay" was awarded for personal injuries under the 
common law in Pennsylvania. Conover v. Bloom, 112 A. 752 
(Pa. 1921). "Where real property has been taken, injured, or 
destroyed, [compensation for delay] . . . is an allowable 
element, and the same is true where the damage is inflicted 
upon personal property; . . . but not where the claim is for 
personal injuries, for then the damages are assessed as of 
the date of the trial, and not of the injury." Id. at 752 
(citations omitted); see also Witmer v. Bessemer & L.E.R. 
Co., 88 A. 314, 315 (Pa. 1913); McGonnell v. Pittsburgh Rys. 
Co., 83 A. 282, 283 (Pa. 1912) ("In a personal injury case 
the damages are assessed as of the date of the trial and not 
of the injury. Hence there can be no general compensation 
for delay."); Pittsburgh S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor , 104 Pa. 306, 
317 (1883) (in a personal injury action, "[i]t was also error 
to permit the jury to allow interest from the date of the 
accident to the time of trial upon the amount they might 
ascertain plaintiff 's damages to have been"). Thus at 
common law in Pennsylvania a victorious plaintiff was only 
entitled to interest from the date of the claim's accrual if 
that claim arose as a contractual obligation for a fixed sum 
due on a particular date or if the claim resulted from 
tortious damage to property. No party to this case has 
brought to our attention any actions in which prejudgment 
interest or compensation for delay was granted on a 
personal injury award prior to the enactment of Rule 238. 
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Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 was enacted in 
1978 to provide successful plaintiffs in actions for damages 
for personal or property injuries with compensation for the 
delay preceding judgment. Its primary provision states: 
 
       At the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking 
       monetary relief for bodily injury, death or property 
       damage, damages for delay shall be added to the 
       amount of compensatory damages awarded against 
       each defendant or additional defendant found to be 
       liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of a jury, in the 
       decision of the court in a nonjury trial or in the award 
       of arbitrators . . . , and shall become part of the 
       verdict, decision or award. 
 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(1). It goes on to award damages in an 
amount that "shall be calculated at the rate equal to the 
prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street 
Journal published for each calendar year for which the 
damages are awarded, plus one percent, not compounded." 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(3). These "delay damages" are only 
available to certain plaintiffs and for certain periods of 
delay. Delay damages are unavailable during periods in 
which the plaintiff caused delay of the trial or if the 
defendant made a reasonable written settlement offer and 
the plaintiff did not recover more than 125 percent of that 
offer after trial. Pa. R. Civ. P. 238(b). 
 
Because the damages awarded pursuant to Rule 238 are 
determined by reference to prevailing interest rates, 
Pennsylvania courts have frequently characterized the rule 
as providing for "prejudgment interest."7 In one of the first 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Taxpayers argue that delay damages available under Rule 238 are not 
"prejudgment interest" and those cases which have so described the rule 
"suffer from . . . inattention to detail." Taxpayers' Opening Br. at 19. 
Given the sheer quantity of cases that have characterized Rule 238 
damages as prejudgment interest, we find this argument to be meritless. 
See, e.g., Weber v. GAF Corp., 15 F.3d 35, 36 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Under 
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238, a prevailing plaintiff in a 
Pennsylvania tort action may receive what amounts to prejudgment 
interest on a compensatory damage award."); Simmons v. City of 
Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1088 (3d Cir. 1991) ("In Savarese, we held 
that, because the application of state substantive law providing for 
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cases addressing the Rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court described it as follows. "Rule 238 pertains to 
prejudgment interest granted in certain instances to 
plaintiffs who receive jury verdicts in excess of any 
settlement offer made by a defendant prior to trial." 
Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 436 A.2d 
147, 149 (Pa. 1981). The Court recognized that the rule's 
source was Pennsylvania's common law heritage of allowing 
prejudgment interest "in cases concerning liquidated 
damages and breach of contract cases," and "to recover 
compensation for delay in payment after loss in tort cases." 
Id. at 154. Nevertheless, the Court noted that Rule 238 
extended those doctrines and "undeniably imposes an 
additional duty upon defendants in the form of 
prejudgment interest." Id. "Rule 238 provides compensation 
to a plaintiff for delay in receiving the monetary damages 
owing as a result of a defendant's tort. This serves to 
indemnify the plaintiff for the money he would have earned 
on his award if he had promptly received it." Id. at 154. It 
is thus transparently clear that Rule 238 established a new 
duty for defendants to provide additional compensation to 
plaintiffs -- not as additional damages for their injury -- 
but to remedy the time value of their award lost during the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
prejudgment interest would destroy the uniformity of damages in federal 
civil rights cases, Rule 238 does not apply to damages awarded under 
section 1983.") (citing Savarese v. Agriss , 883 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 
1989)); 
Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255, 1263-64 (3d Cir. 1991) ("the 
assessment of pre-judgment interest, sometimes called delay damages"); 
Trude v. Martin, 660 A.2d 626, 635-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("This result 
logically obtains from the new Rule which, while labelled "delay 
damages," is really in the nature of prejudgment interest to be added to 
compensatory damages awarded at verdict."); Hodges v. Rodriquez, 645 
A.2d 1340, 1349 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) ("The Laudenberger Court equated 
delay damages with prejudgment interest."); Moran v. G. & W.H. Corson, 
Inc., 586 A.2d 416, 426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("In effect, Rule 238 
provides for the award, in appropriate cases, of prejudgment interest."); 
Tindal v. SEPTA, 560 A.2d 183, 189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ("the new Rule 
which, while labelled [sic] "delay damages," is really in the nature of 
pre- 
judgment interest to be added to compensatory damages awarded at 
verdict"); Snelsire v. Moxon, 557 A.2d 785, 787 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
("Damages awardable under Rule 238 have been held to be in the nature 
of prejudgment interest."). 
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period preceding judgment. See Costa v. Lauderdale Beach 
Hotel, 626 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. 1993).8  
 
Having concluded that Rule 238 permits the awarding of 
prejudgment interest, we must recognize one caveat. As the 
Taxpayers' repeatedly assert, delay damages are not 
available to all successful tort plaintiffs as a matter of right, 
but can only be awarded either when the defendant did not 
make a reasonable settlement offer or for periods of time for 
which the plaintiff is not responsible for causing delay. See 
Schrock v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 589 A.2d 1103, 1107 
(Pa. 1991). Delay damages thus serve a secondary purpose 
to hasten the settlement and conduct of tort actions. See 
Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 151. "Delay damages are 
incentive to settle and to avoid delay of trial . . . because 
the defendant may limit the size of the compensation award 
by settling the case or by choosing not to engage in dilatory 
pretrial tactics." Costa, 626 A.2d at 570. In this context, 
Rule 238 serves two related purposes. "Undeniably, [Rule 
238] serves to compensate the plaintiff for the inability to 
utilize funds rightfully due him, but the basic aim of the 
rule is to alleviate delay in the disposition of cases, thereby 
lessening congestion in the courts." Laudenberger, 436 A.2d 
at 151. To accomplish that aim, the Pennsylvania courts do 
not apply Rule 238 without regard for the defendant's fault 
in hampering early settlement and adjudication. 9 
 
       In making a decision on a plaintiff 's entitlement to 
       delay damages[,] the mere length of time between the 
       starting date and the verdict is not to be the sole 
       criterion. The fact finder shall consider: the parties' 
       respective responsibilities in requesting continuances[;] 
       the parties' compliance with rules of discovery; the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. "Conversely, delay damages also prevent a defendant from being 
unjustly enriched by keeping the interest that could be earned during 
the litigation process on what is essentially the plaintiff 's money." See 
Costa, 626 A.2d at 569 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 
9. Indeed, following the decision in Craig v. Magee Memorial 
Rehabilitation Ctr. Rule 238 was amended to ensure that delay damages 
turned on fault by eliminating those provisions that granted delay 
damages automatically and replacing them with a hearing on the parties' 
fault as discussed in Craig. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 238, Explanatory 
Comment--1988. 
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       respective responsibilities for delay necessitated by the 
       joinder of additional parties; and other pertinent 
       factors. 
 
Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Ctr., 515 A.2d 1350, 
1353 (Pa. 1986). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
described these considerations as "procedural fault." Costa, 
626 A.2d at 570. "The considerations that the Craig court 
listed as relevant to fault are all factors relevant to the 
delay of trial." Id. Rule 238 thus exists as a hybrid 
prejudgment interest statute, attempting to make whole the 
tort victim who has been denied use of his or her money 
rightfully due when the cause of action accrued, but 
conditioning the grant of that remedy on the parties' 
relative "procedural fault" in delaying adjudication of the 
underlying tort. 
 
C. 
 
Three other courts of appeals have addressed whether 
prejudgment interest on a personal injury award is entitled 
to exemption from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
S 104(a)(2) because it is received "on account of " personal 
injury. See Rozpad v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
1998) (discussing R.I. Gen. Laws S 9-21-10 (1985)); Brabson 
v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir.) (discussing 
Colo. Rev. Stat. S 13-21-101(1) (1979)), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 1039 (1996); Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124, 
130 (1993) (discussing Mich. Comp. Laws S 600.6013 
(1987)), aff 'd without opinion, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 963 (1994). All have found that 
prejudgment interest is taxable. 
 
In Kovacs, the first of the prejudgment interest cases, the 
Tax Court parsed the traditional distinction between 
"damages" and "interest" and noted that"damages are the 
principal sum on which the interest is owed, and ordinary 
usage suggests the two are separate." Kovacs , 100 T.C. at 
129. The Court went on to cite extensively from the long 
tradition of taxing postjudgment interest without regard to 
the fact that it was earned on a personal injury award. See 
id.; see also Aames v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 189 (1990) 
("The nature of interest is that it is paid because of delay in 
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the receipt of funds, in this case the principal amount 
awarded to plaintiff and designated `damages' by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. As interest, it is 
taxable to petitioner."); Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 
1339, 1341 (1933) ("The rule that we draw from the above 
cases is that interest is properly allowable [as income] upon 
a judgment or award of damages for personal injuries when 
the amount of the damages has been ascertained and 
reduced to judgment."). Lacking any indication in Michigan 
law that prejudgment interest should be considered 
differently from "interest" generally, the Court concluded 
that prejudgment interest was not exempted from income 
simply because it was earned on a personal injury award,10 
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 131. 
 
The Tenth Circuit in Brabson was critical of the Kovacs 
opinion's overt reliance on the labels "damages" and 
"interest" in determining the taxability of prejudgment 
interest. Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1045. Brabson's rejection of 
Kovacs was due, in part, to the fact that the Colorado 
Supreme Court had characterized prejudgment interest as 
a component of damages, thus blurring meaningful 
distinction between the two concepts. See Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Starke, 797 P.2d 14, 19 (Colo. 1990) ("prejudgment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We reject the argument proffered by the dissent in Kovacs, and 
suggested by the Taxpayers here, that the Periodic Payment Settlement 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-473, S 101, 96 Stat. 2605 (1982) -- which added 
the phrase "and whether as lump sums or periodic payments" after the 
clause "whether by suit or agreement" in S 104(a)(2) -- was also intended 
by Congress to make all receipts of interest on personal injury awards 
nontaxable. See Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 134-35 (Halpern, J., dissenting). As 
has been frequently noted, neither the text of the statutory language nor 
its legislative history, S. Rep. No. 97-646, at 8 (1982) ("This provision 
is 
intended to codify, rather than change, present law"), supports the 
dissent's position that Congress intended substantive changes to the 
treatment of interest in S 104(a)(2). See Rozpad, 154 F.3d at 5 ("[I]t 
seems likely that Congress's decision not to tax periodic payments 
reflects recognition of the administrative difficulties of such a task--
and 
nothing more."); Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1045 n.5 ("There is nothing in the 
act . . . that indicates a general Congressional or administrative 
position 
toward the exclusion of prejudgment interest."); Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 132 
("[W]e perceive no relief that [petitioners who receive a lump sum award] 
can derive from the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982."). 
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interest is an element of compensatory damages in actions 
for personal injuries, awarded to compensate the plaintiff 
for the time value of the award eventually obtained against 
the tortfeasor"). Nonetheless, the Court in Brabson found 
prejudgment interest to be taxable for two reasons. 
 
First, it noted that "[p]rejudgment interest was rarely 
available under the common law, and never for personal 
injuries." Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1046. Because the common 
law in Colorado had never provided for prejudgment 
interest on personal injuries until the amendment of Colo. 
Rev. Stat. S 13-21-101(1) to that effect in 1979, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that Congress could not have intended 
prejudgment interest to be included among those damages 
exempt from taxation in the predecessor provisions to 
today's S 104(a)(2). Id. This conclusion was well-founded, for 
it is beyond cavil that Congress in the early twentieth 
century was cognizant of the common law prohibition on 
the award of prejudgment interest in personal injury 
actions. See Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 
330, 337 (1988) (discussing whether Congress provided for 
prejudgment interest in the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
of 1908 ("FELA") and noting that Congress was aware that 
"the common law did not allow prejudgment interest in 
suits for personal injury or wrongful death. . . . This was 
the rule in the federal courts."). The Brabson court thus 
discounted the characterizations of the Colorado Supreme 
Court that prejudgment interest was an element of 
compensatory damages. It instead recognized Congress 
provided no indication that prejudgment interest should be 
exempted from taxation as received on account of a 
personal injury. Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1046."While the 
Colorado statute may contemplate a different 
understanding of the concept of damages, we believe it 
contrary to the concept of damages for personal injuries as 
understood in the Revenue Act of 1918 and maintained 
ever since." Id. 
 
Secondly, the Tenth Circuit in Brabson recognized that 
delay damages did not fit easily within the human capital 
rationale that underlies S 104(a)(2). "[C]ompensation for the 
lost time value of money is caused by the delay in attaining 
judgment. Time becomes the relevant factor, not the injury 
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itself -- the longer the procedural delay, the higher the 
amount." Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1047. The Brabson court 
noted that the quantity of prejudgment interest turns not 
on the personal injury itself, but instead on the time value 
of money. It concluded that the time value of money is not 
received "on account of " a tort-like injury and therefore 
cannot satisfy the second showing required by Schleier, 515 
U.S. at 337. "In short, though [prejudgment interest] is 
related to the injury, both in terms of existence and 
computation, the award of prejudgment interest is not 
linked to the injury in the same direct way as traditional 
tort remedies." Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1047. 
 
Lastly, the First Circuit in Rozpad, 154 F.3d at 5-7, 
neatly synthesized the Kovacs and Brabson decisions. The 
Court agreed with the conclusion in Kovacs that there is no 
distinction between prejudgment and postjudgment 
interest. 
 
       It is true that many of the cases discussed in Kovacs 
       deal with post-judgment interest--but the petitioners 
       fail to persuade us that this distinction makes a 
       meaningful difference. Interest, whether pre- or post- 
       judgment, compensates for delay in payment, and is 
       specifically included in the litany of income items 
       subject to taxation under section 61. 
 
Rozpad, 154 F.3d at 5. The First Circuit also credited 
Brabson's application of the second requisite showing 
under Schleier -- that "the damages were received on 
account of personal injuries or sickness." Schleier, 515 U.S. 
at 337. Applying the two-part test of Schleier , Rozpad 
concluded, much like Brabson, "that prejudgment interest 
is not `damages' received `on account of ' a personal injury, 
and is, therefore, taxable." Rozpad, 154 F.3d at 6. The 
Court thought it important that, under Rhode Island law, 
"interest is separate and distinct from damages, and is 
awarded mainly to compensate for a delay in payment." Id. 
This delay in payment is not caused by the personal injury, 
but rather "the injury causes damages, thus creating the 
fund on which interest for delay in payment is owed." Id. 
The First Circuit then reiterated Brabson's conclusion that 
Congress could not have intended that prejudgment 
interest be included in the predecessor to S 104(a)(2), 
 
                                16 
 
 
 
because prejudgment interest was unavailable at the 
common law in personal injury torts. Id. at 7. 
 
We discern no meaningful distinction between delay 
damages received pursuant to Rule 238 and the 
prejudgment interest statutes in cases such as Kovacs, 
Brabson and Rozpad.11 The common law in Pennsylvania is 
no different from that in Colorado or Rhode Island with 
respect to prejudgment interest. Personal injury plaintiffs in 
neither of these states were entitled to prejudgment interest 
as a component of their remedy at the common law. See 
Conover, 112 A. at 752 (Pennsylvania); Brabson, 73 F.3d at 
1046 (Colorado); Rozpad, 154 F.3d at 7 (Rhode Island). 
Prejudgment interest in personal injury cases 
 
       was unheard-of in 1919 when Congress enacted the 
       direct lineal ancestor of section 104(a)(2), section 
       213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 
       1057, 1066 (1919). Since the exclusion for personal 
       injury awards has been handed down almost verbatim 
       from 1919 forward, Congress could not conceivably 
       have intended the exclusion to apply to prejudgment 
       interest. 
 
Rozpad, 154 F.3d at 7. As noted above, the Supreme Court 
used similar reasoning in concluding that FELA, enacted in 
1908, did not provide for the award of prejudgment interest 
because the common law did not allow for it and it was 
"unpersuaded that Congress intended to abrogate that 
doctrine sub silentio." Monessen, 486 U.S. at 337-38 
(concluding that Pennsylvania courts may not award 
prejudgment interest pursuant to Rule 238 in FELA 
actions). We must similarly conclude that Congress did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Indeed, in Laudenberger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described 
the Michigan prejudgment interest statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 
S 600.6013, discussed in Kovacs, the Colorado prejudgment interest 
statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 13-21-101, discussed in Brabson, and 
the Rhode Island prejudgment interest statute, R.I. Gen. Laws S 9-21-10, 
discussed in Rozpad, among others, as "similar pre-trial interest 
provisions." Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 153. The only distinction drawn 
between these statutes and Rule 238 in Laudenberger was their method 
of enactment, the former three by legislative enactment and the latter by 
the promulgation of court rules. Id. 
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intend S 104(a)(2) to exempt prejudgment interest when no 
Pennsylvania plaintiff recovering for personal injury would 
have been awarded such interest at common law. 
 
The Taxpayers' attempts to argue otherwise are 
unpersuasive. They would have us draw a distinction 
between "interest," awarded as of right for the failure to pay 
a liquidated sum on a fixed day, and "compensation for 
delay," which was sometimes available in property torts 
such as "unintentional conversion or destruction of 
property." Citizens' Natural Gas Co., 18 A. at 600. From 
this distinction, the Taxpayers argue that while interest was 
not awarded in personal injury cases at the common law, 
"compensation for the delay" was awarded when the 
circumstances demanded, and thus it is proper to assume 
that the award of "compensation for the delay" should be 
exempted from taxation. This argument is unpersuasive for 
two reasons. One, this Court has previously noted that the 
distinction between "interest" and "compensation for the 
delay" is minimal -- "a charming legal fiction, in the true 
ancient Roman ficto, fictiones, sense." American Enka, 686 
F.2d at 1056. Two, even acknowledging the distinction 
between "interest" and "compensation for the delay," 
neither of these theories of recovery would have entitled the 
Taxpayers in this case to the recovery of prejudgment 
interest prior to the enactment of Rule 238 because neither 
extended to personal injuries. See Conover, 112 A. at 752; 
Witmer, 88 A. at 315; McGonnell, 83 A. at 283; Pittsburgh S. 
Ry. Co. 104 Pa. at 317. Thus, irrespective of any distinction 
between "interest" and "compensation for delay," the 
common law history in Pennsylvania is no different than 
that announced in Brabson: 
 
        Prejudgment interest was rarely available under the 
       common law, and never for personal injuries. . . . The 
       requirement of a liquidated sum, `fixed and known,' 
       posed the greatest obstacle towards recovery of such 
       interest. 
 
       . . . . 
 
        Thus prejudgment interest, when awarded at all, 
       generally compensated for pecuniary harms, most often 
       easily determinable contractual ones. It is only more 
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       recently, pursuant to certain statutes, that 
       prejudgment interest has become recoverable in 
       personal injury suits on nonpecuniary harms. 
 
Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1046. Lacking any basis in common 
law for the award of prejudgment interest, in any form, for 
cases such as the Taxpayers', it cannot be said that 
Congress, in enacting S 104(a)(2) and its predecessors, 
intended the exclusion of prejudgment interest, such as 
Rule 238 delay damages, from income. 
 
In contrast, it is well established that the exclusion for 
personal injury was intended to exempt from income 
damages that "substitute for any normally untaxed 
personal (or financial) quality, good, or `asset.' " O'Gilvie, 
519 U.S. at 86. The Supreme Court recognized in O'Gilvie 
that the "human-capital" rationale is founded on tax- 
equality, that is, establishing that an injured person is no 
better or worse off, from a tax perspective, as a similar 
person who had not been injured. Id. (holding that punitive 
damages are not received "on account of " a personal 
injury); see also Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 433 n.8 
("Damages for personal injury are by definition 
compensatory only."). While the Court in O'Gilvie recognized 
that S 104(a)(2) does not accomplish this purpose perfectly 
because it excludes from taxation both the traditionally 
untaxed "damages that aim to substitute for a victim's 
physical or personal well-being" and the traditionally taxed 
"damages that substitute . . . for lost wages," nevertheless 
the Court emphasized that the human capital rationale was 
the "original mooring[ ]" of S 104(a)(2). O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 
86. That original mooring dictates that "there is no strong 
reason for trying to interpret the statute's language to reach 
beyond those damages that, making up for a loss, seek to 
make a victim whole, or speaking very loosely, `return the 
victim's personal or financial capital.' " Id. 
 
While Taxpayers repeatedly assert that delay damages 
are intended to make a victim whole, see Costa , 626 A.2d 
at 569 ("the `essence of this duty' was merely to extend the 
`compensatory damages necessary to make a plaintiff 
whole' "), we must recognize that the purpose they serve is 
more specific than that simple generalization. As stated in 
Laudenberger, the essence of Rule 238 is to"provide[ ] 
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compensation to a plaintiff for delay in receiving the 
monetary damages owing as a result of a defendant's tort. 
This serves to indemnify the plaintiff for the money he 
would have earned on his award if he had promptly 
received it." 436 A.2d at 154. It cannot be rationally 
contended that the "money he would have earned on his 
award" is anything but interest. Interest is"the 
compensation fixed by agreement or allowed by law for the 
use or detention of money. . ." Black's Law Dictionary 816 
(7th ed. 1999). 
 
As noted in Kovacs, since the 1933 case of Riddle v. 
Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1339, interest received after 
judgment is taxable. See Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 129. "Since 
Riddle, the exclusion for personal injury damages has been 
reenacted and amended numerous times. Nevertheless, the 
statute continues to exclude only `damages' and omits any 
mention of `interest'. This implies a continuing acceptance 
by Congress of the existing interpretation of the exclusion." 
Id. at 130. 
 
We are unable to divine a meaningful distinction between 
postjudgment interest and delay damages. Both 
compensate the plaintiff for the delay in payment of the 
principal - the jury's damage award. See Rozpad , 154 F.3d 
at 5. Unless the intervention of the judgment somehow 
changes the nature of that additional compensation, delay 
damages or prejudgment interest should be taxable in the 
same way as postjudgment interest. See 26 U.S.C. 
S 61(a)(4). 
 
Taxpayers distinguish Rule 238 delay damages from 
interest generally because they are not awarded in every 
case as a matter of right, but instead only when the 
defendant caused delay or failed to make a reasonable 
settlement offer. See Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 151 ("[T]his 
rule serves to compensate the plaintiff for the inability to 
utilize finds rightfully due him"). Their argument posits that 
the harm caused to the plaintiffs by delay in receiving 
compensation for their injury is a separate wrong that 
Pennsylvania has chosen to compensate with damages. 
They argue that Pennsylvania courts have established that 
Rule 238 protects "the personal right of the plaintiff to have 
his day in court and not to suffer the increment to the 
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indignity, pain, embarrassment and humiliation of his 
bodily injuries caused by the delay in receiving just 
compensation for those injuries . . . ." Taxpayers' Opening 
Br. at 26. The defendant's liability for this compensation is 
described as a "procedural fault." Costa , 626 A.2d at 570. 
 
We find this argument unavailing because the Taxpayers 
cannot establish that a remedy for the harm incurred in 
this respect is based on "tort" or "tort-like" rights.12 See 
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 335. There is no doubt that the 
Taxpayers suffered some difficulties and harms resulting 
from the delay of more than ten years in receiving 
recompense for the automobile accident, but "[t]he fact that 
[an action] causes harm to individuals does not 
automatically imply, however, that there exists a tort-like 
`personal injury' for purposes of federal income tax law." 
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992). Instead, 
the Supreme Court in Burke emphasized the consideration 
of traditional tort principles in evaluating theS 104(a)(2) 
exemption and stated that "one of the hallmarks of 
traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range 
of damages to compensate the plaintiff `fairly for injuries 
caused by the violation of his legal rights.' " Id. at 234-35 
(citation omitted). Rule 238 delay damages do not fit within 
this injury compensation rubric. Instead, they only 
compensate for the additional economic harm -- as 
opposed to the injury itself -- caused by the deprivation 
over a period of time of the underlying remedy. See 
Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 154. 
 
Recognizing that the narrow remedial scheme of Rule 238 
is persuasive evidence that delay damages are not based in 
tort or tort-type rights, Taxpayers argue that delay damages 
should be analogized to liquidated damages that serve a 
compensatory function. The Supreme Court noted in 
Schleier, while discussing the taxability of the liquidated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. While we acknowledge that the underlying recovery of damages for 
personal injury is based in tort, we are required under S 104(a)(2) to 
parse the separate elements of the damages award to ensure that each 
fulfills the statute's criteria. See Schleier , 515 U.S. at 330 ("each 
element 
of the settlement is recoverable not simply because the taxpayer received 
a tort settlement, but rather because each element of the settlement 
satisfies the requirement set forth in S 104(a)(2)"). 
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damages permitted by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), "that if Congress had 
intended the ADEA's liquidated damages to compensate 
plaintiffs for personal injuries, those damages might well 
come within S 104(a)(2)'s exclusion." Schleier, 515 U.S. at 
331. From this Taxpayers argue that Rule 238 is a 
liquidated damages scheme, intended to compensate 
plaintiffs for personal injuries, and that such damages are 
therefore exempt from taxation under S 104(a)(2). We reject 
this argument, however, for the same reason that the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument in Schleier  - neither 
delay damages nor liquidated damages in the ADEA 
compensate for a `personal,' as opposed to `economic,' 
harm. The Court noted in both Schleier13 and Burke that 
"compensation" exempt from taxation underS 104(a)(2) 
must be for "traditional harms associated with personal 
injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, 
harm to reputation, or other consequential damages." 
Burke, 504 U.S. at 239; Schleier, 515 U.S. at 335-36 (citing 
Burke). While we recognize that the deprivation of a 
monetary remedy for an underlying personal injury may, of 
itself, cause additional emotional distress and other 
damages, Rule 238 provides only for compensation for the 
"economic" harm caused by the defendant's refusal to settle 
reasonably and expediently a meritorious claim and not for 
the potential harm on which Taxpayers assert we should 
exempt all delay damages. Because compensation for 
"economic" harm in the form of interest is usually taxable 
and thus is "not a substitute for any normally untaxed 
personal (or financial) quality, good, or `asset,' " we see no 
reason why either the statutory text of S 104(a)(2) or its 
rationale would support exempting delay damages from 
income. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86. 
 
Nor is our conclusion that delay damages are not 
included within the scope of S 104(a)(2) swayed by the 
Taxpayers' argument that the 1996 amendments to that 
statute alter our analysis. In 1996, Congress passed the 
Small Business Job Protection Act, which expressly made 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Indeed, the Schleier Court noted the presence of liquidated damages 
in the ADEA was not "sufficient to bring it within Burke's conception of 
a `tort type righ[t].' " Schleier , 515 U.S. at 335. 
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punitive damages taxable and limited the exemption to 
"physical" personal injuries and "physical" sickness. See 
110 Stat. 1755, 1838-39, Pub. L. 104-188, S 1605 (August 
20, 1996). Because the Taxpayers' settlement was agreed 
upon before the effective date of the amendment, it is 
undisputed that the additions to S 104(a)(2) do not apply to 
this case. Nonetheless, the Taxpayers argue that language 
from the House Report on the amendments to S 104(a)(2), 
when read in conjunction with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Schleier, demonstrates a congressional intent 
that courts construe the personal injury exemption broadly 
to include delay damages. 
 
The passage on which Taxpayers rely states in its 
relevant portion that "[i]f an action has its origin in a 
physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages 
(other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are 
treated as payments received on account of physical injury 
or physical sickness." H.R. Rep. No. 104-586 at 143-44 
(1996) (emphasis added). We ignore for the moment that 
the 1996 amendments are inapplicable to the Taxpayers' 
action. Their argument is that the use of "all damages . . . 
that flow therefrom" indicates a congressional intent to 
expand S 104(a)(2) to include delay damages. 
 
This is unpersuasive for two reasons. One, the House 
Report on which the Taxpayers rely does not mention 
interest at all, but instead was intended to emphasize that 
damages for emotional distress, defamation, discrimination 
and other non-physical torts do not result in tax-exempt 
recoveries under S 104(a)(2). Id. Thus, the legislative history 
is not clearly in support of the Taxpayers' suggested 
interpretation of the statute. Two, the Supreme Court's 
opinion in O'Gilvie forecloses the possibility that all 
damages that flow from a personal injury are exempt from 
taxation. 519 U.S. at 82. In O'Gilvie, decided in 1998 but 
interpreting the same pre-amendment version of S 104(a)(2) 
with which we are concerned, the Court held that the"on 
account of " language of the statute cannot be interpreted 
to require only a "but-for" connection between the 
underlying personal injury and the award at issue. Id. It 
cautioned that such a broad scope "would thereby bring 
virtually all personal injury lawsuit damages within the 
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scope of the provision, since: `but for the personal injury, 
there would be no lawsuit, and but for the lawsuit, there 
would be no damages.' " Id. Thus, the Court rejected a 
formulation of "on account of " that is substantially 
identical to the language used in the House Report -that 
"all damages . . . that flow therefrom" should be exempt. 
Even if we were to assume that this lone statement from 
the legislative history of the 1996 amendment applied to 
prior versions of the statute, the Supreme Court has 
rejected such an expansive interpretation of S 104(a)(2). 
 
Having considered both the language of S 104(a)(2) and 
its rationale, we are not persuaded that Rule 238 delay 
damages can be meaningfully distinguished from 
prejudgment interest in general simply because they are 
only available when the defendant has delayed the trial or 
not made an adequate settlement offer. For this reason, we 
affirm the District Court's ruling that the Taxpayers' 
recovery of delay damages should have been taxed. 
 
IV. ALLOCATING DELAY D AMAGES IN SETTLEMENT 
 
Having concluded that delay damages received pursuant 
to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 are not exempt 
from taxation as damages received on account of personal 
injury, we proceed to whether the District Court allocated 
the proper measure of delay damages from the total 
recovery received in settlement. The IRS suggested, and the 
District Court found, that 46% of the $3.4 million received 
in settlement was properly allocated to delay damages 
because that was the same proportion of the trial court's 
total award apportioned to delay damages. After reducing 
the taxable income to the amount actually received by the 
Taxpayers after payment of attorneys' fees and costs,14 the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. No party has contested the propriety of the IRS's initial deduction of 
all legal fees and expenses from the award before determining taxable 
income. But see Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116, 137 n.15 
(1994), ("In the case of a settlement that includes damages both 
includable in income under sec. 61(a) and excludable from income under 
sec. 104(a)(2), the Court generally determines the deductibility of any 
underlying legal fees by allocating the fees in the same proportion as the 
excludable and includable portions of the settlement.") (citing Stocks v. 
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IRS proposed to tax 46% of the net settlement received by 
the Taxpayers. Using this formula, the IRS determined that 
$1,033,954 was taxable income.- 
 
Before proceeding to the Taxpayers' assignments of error 
on this point, we note that "the taxpayer bears the ultimate 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
[the IRS's] assessment is erroneous." Sullivan v. United 
States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1980). Because IRS 
tax assessments are presumed to be correct, "[i]t is not 
enough for [the Taxpayers] to demonstrate that the 
assessment of the tax for which refund is sought was 
erroneous in some respects." United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 440 (1976). Instead, the taxpayer "bears the 
burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover." Id.; 
see also Freck v. Internal Revenue Serv., 37 F.3d 986, 992 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (IRS tax assessments are generally 
presumed to be correct). 
 
The Taxpayers' burden in this respect is made more 
difficult by the reasonableness of the IRS's allocation. It is 
a tenet of federal tax law that income received in settlement 
of a claim should be taxed in the same manner as if it had 
been received on that claim in court. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 
305 U.S. 188, 196 (1938) ("We think that the distinction 
sought to be made between acquisition through such a 
judgment and acquisition by a compromise agreement in 
lieu of such a judgment is too formal to be sound, as it 
disregards the substance of the statutory exemption."). To 
maintain tax equality between settlements and court 
awards, we determine the tax implications of a settlement 
by ascertaining the obligation or claim initially resolved by 
judgment in lieu of which the settlement was made. See 
Alexander v. Internal Revenue Serv., 72 F.3d 938, 942 (1st 
Cir. 1995); Getty v. Commissioner, 913 F.2d 1486, 1490 
(9th Cir. 1990); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1, 18 (1992)), aff 'd 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995)); 
Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 860 (1987) (same), aff 'd, 845 
F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988) (table). Because this issue has not been 
presented on appeal, we limit our opinion to the propriety of the 
allocation of net settlement proceeds. 
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F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.) ("The test is not whether the action 
was one in tort or contract but rather the question to be 
asked is `In lieu of what were the damages awarded?' "), 
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). Because it is the 
defendant who chooses to pay settlement of the plaintiff 's 
claims, several courts have held that, in the absence of a 
written settlement agreement parsing the claims that 
comprise a general settlement, it is the "intent of the payor" 
that is the most persuasive evidence of the nature of claims 
settled by that party to avoid litigation. See Knuckles v. 
Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965); Agar v. 
Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961); Ray v. 
United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 535, 540 (1992), aff 'd, 989 F.2d 
1204 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (table); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 
T.C. 834, 847 (1987), aff 'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(table); Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 244 (1986), 
aff 'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Glynn v. Commissioner, 
76 T.C. 116, 120 (1981), aff 'd, 676 F.2d 682 (table) (1st 
Cir. 1982). "If the settlement agreement lacks express 
language stating that the payment was (or was not) made 
on account of personal injury, then the most important fact 
in determining how section 104(a)(2) is to be applied is `the 
intent of the payor' as to the purpose in making the 
payment." Metzger, 88 T.C. at 847-48. 
 
The Taxpayers aver that the Settlement Agreement in this 
case lacks any express language parsing the payment of the 
defendants between personal injury damages and delay 
damages. Lacking any evidence of allocation in the 
settlement agreement, they maintain that the only evidence 
presented to the Court was the affidavit of Don P. Foster, 
Taxpayers' counsel in the personal injury litigation, in 
which he asserts that no consideration was given to delay 
damages in the settlement negotiations and that the tax 
consequences of the agreement were never considered by 
the parties. Therefore, their argument proceeds, the District 
Court erred in refusing to credit the only evidence with 
which it was presented on the subject of allocation. 
 
We are unpersuaded. Because the "intent of the payor" is 
paramount in determining the nature of the settled claims, 
it is admittedly difficult to discern the nature of settled 
claims in an agreement that fails to distinguish the 
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separate elements of recovery. Yet in situations like this,15 
where there has been a judgment in a trial court that 
preceded settlement of the claims, the most persuasive 
evidence of the payor's intent in settling the case is the 
previous damages award of that court. Recognizing this 
logic, the First Circuit has stated that 
 
       when the interest component of a personal injury 
       settlement can be delineated with accuracy and ease-- 
       as when there has been a jury verdict and an ensuing 
       judgment that contains separate itemizations of 
       damages and interest -- a subsequent settlement that 
       does not purport to make a different allocation is quite 
       logically viewed as including a pro rata share of 
       interest. 
 
Rozpad, 154 F.3d at 3-4. This logic is convincing. In 
Rozpad, two sets of plaintiffs had settled personal injury 
suits after successfully prosecuting their actions and 
receiving jury awards for personal injury damages to which 
prejudgment interest was added by the trial court. Id. at 1. 
Neither of the settlements allocated the settlement award 
between personal injury damages and prejudgment interest. 
Id. The Tax Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that, 
because the settlement agreement did not allocate between 
taxable and tax-exempt damages, none of the settlement 
award was taxable and the First Circuit affirmed. Id. When 
"the parties have settled a claim for a liquidated amount 
. . . it is not unfair to assume, in the absence of a contrary 
allocation . . . that interest and damages compose the same 
proportion of the settlement as of the antecedent 
judgment." Id. at 4. 
 
The IRS and District Court were thus justified in 
assuming, under the facts of this case, that the proportion 
of interest to damages reflected that of the preceding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The circumstances of this case do not require us to reach the tax 
consequences of a personal injury settlement agreed upon before 
adjudication of the claims in court. Cf. Rozpad v. Commissioner, 154 
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1998) ("When the interest component of a personal 
injury settlement is difficult to delineate, there is every reason for 
courts 
(and the Commissioner) to defer to section 104(a)(2) and treat the 
entirety as free from tax."). 
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judgment. As previously noted, the settlement was for $3.4 
million, just fractionally less than the Taxpayers' combined 
judgment awarded at trial and affirmed on appeal. 16 Thus, 
the Foster affidavit was not the District Court's only 
evidence on allocation. It was not even the best evidence. 
 
Nor was it error for the District Court to have rejected 
Foster's assertions that the settlement contained no delay 
damages. According to the affidavit, "settlement amounts 
were derived at solely from a consideration on behalf of the 
plaintiffs of the risks to which they would be subjected by 
refusing to settle the case while an appeal was pending." 
(emphasis added). This statement is not probative of any 
fact relevant to our inquiry; instead it is the"payor's intent" 
- the defendants in the Taxpayers' personal injury suit - 
which is relevant. On the subject of the defendants' 
intentions, the affidavit states, "discussions with 
defendants' representatives concerned the considerable 
exposure to a larger verdict[,] in the event defendants 
prevailed on the their appeal and a new trial was granted[,] 
because of Mr. Francisco's continuing and worsening 
condition." This statement does not help the Taxpayers' 
argument. For even if the defendants were concerned with 
the possible exposure to a larger damages award on 
remand, that does not support the inference that the 
defendants sought to allocate its payments in this 
settlement entirely to personal injury, as opposed to some 
pro rata portion of both personal injury damages and delay 
damages. That is, the defendants' concern with a later, 
larger judgment supports the inference that they wished to 
settle sooner for less money; it does not support the 
inference that they intended only to pay personal injury 
compensation in the settlement.17 Indeed, if the defendants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Indeed, Foster's affidavit candidly admits that the verdicts were a 
starting point for settlement negotiations. "The verdicts, including Rule 
238 damages, were considered only for the purpose of establishing the 
dollar exposure around which negotiations with defendants centered." 
 
17. Though not the case here, it is possible that parties could allocate 
contractually the whole of a settlement only to the non-taxable portion 
of a prior judgment. In McKay v. Commissioner , 102 T.C. 465, 487 
(1994), vacated on other grounds, 84 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 1996) 
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were motivated by their future exposure in the event of a 
possible new trial, they nonetheless had every reason to 
believe that any future increased judgment would include 
increased delay damages commensurate with the increased 
compensatory damages. 
 
Furthermore, even had the District Court accepted the 
Foster affidavit to establish the proposition that the 
settlement agreement was intended by the payor to provide 
no compensation for delay damages, it was within the 
Court's province to reject that evidence. The general rule is 
that a trial court may reject the parties' allocation of claims, 
even when that allocation is contained within the 
settlement itself. See Delaney v. Commissioner , 99 F.3d 20, 
25 (1st Cir. 1996). In Delaney, that court was presented 
with "a $250,000 postjudgment settlement literally 
allocating nothing to statutory prejudgment interest 
notwithstanding the $112,000 prejudgment interest 
component concededly included in the $287,000 superior 
court judgment." Delaney, 99 F.3d at 24. Faced with a 
settlement agreement so markedly different in allocation 
from the underlying judgment, the Tax Court rejected the 
parties' allocation of the settlement's components and 
instead substituted, for tax purposes, the IRS's allocation of 
the ratio of prejudgment interest to the total award. Id. at 
25. The First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's reallocation, 
holding that it "supportably ruled that the [taxpayers] had 
not overcome the presumption of correctness to which the 
Commissioner's allocation is entitled, [and that] the 
allocation of 39% of the settlement amount to statutory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(unpublished), the Tax Court found that the payor's intent was only to 
compensate the non-taxable libel portion of the jury award and not the 
taxable punitive damages or civil RICO claims. McKay is distinguishable 
from the current case because that Court found: (1) the parties were 
adversarial on the allocation because the plaintiff wished to have 
damages allocated to the RICO claims; (2) the defendant refused to settle 
punitive damages and RICO claims; (3) the agreed settlement expressly 
stated that it did not compensate the plaintiff for the punitive damages 
and RICO claims; and (4) the resulting settlement of non-taxable, 
compensatory damages was less than the value of those compensatory 
claims awarded by the jury. See id. at 484; see also Bagley v. 
Commissioner, 121 F.3d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing McKay). 
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prejudgment interest, substantially based upon the 
aforementioned parallelism [to the trial court's award], did 
not constitute error." Id. at 25-26. In rejecting the 
settlement's allocation of no value to prejudgment interest, 
the Court in Delaney relied on cases that established a 
duty to look beyond the "language subscribed to by the 
parties," and to determine if the presumption of correctness 
attending the IRS's allocation is overcome. Id.  at 23. These 
cases recognize that parties rarely have a bona fide dispute 
over the allocation of damages within the settlement 
agreement, and thus the written allocation may be driven 
by tax considerations and not reflect the true value of 
settled claims. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 34, 
37-38 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the settling parties were 
not adversaries in determining the allocation of the 
settlement for tax purposes and that its 5% allocation to 
taxable punitive damages, after a sizable punitive damages 
judgment, was not credible), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 824 
(1996); Taggi v. United States, 35 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1994) 
("The Tax Court consistently has stressed the importance of 
a bona fide dispute over excludable damages."); Threlkeld v. 
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1307 (1986) ("the specific 
allocation contained in the settlement agreement does not 
necessarily control in deciding whether the claim being 
settled arises from a personal injury"), aff 'd, 848 F.2d 81 
(6th Cir. 1988); Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 121 
(1981) (rejecting the settlement agreement's implication that 
the settled claims might have been for personal injury when 
the claims asserted by plaintiff were wholly contractual), 
aff 'd, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982) (table). 
 
It is thus well established that in cases in which the 
settlement agreement's allocation of damages does not 
reflect the true nature of the underlying award, the District 
Court has a duty to look behind the agreement of the 
parties to discern the true nature of the "payor's intent" in 
settling claims. Similarly, when a party, such as the 
Taxpayers here, asserts that the allocation intended by the 
payor is different than that contained in the underlying 
judgment (which, if adopted by the IRS, enjoys a rebuttable 
presumption status), courts are obliged to measure the 
veracity of, and support for, that assertion. See Kurowski v. 
Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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Moreover, our review of the District Court's determination 
of the payor's intent is particularly deferential because it 
must weigh "all of the facts and circumstances in 
ascertaining the true substance or nature of the claim that 
was settled." McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. at 482. 
Questions of what claims the payors intended to settle18 are 
factual. See Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1, 11 (1992) 
("The first matter that we must determine is what the 
settlement settled. This is a factual inquiry."). We will only 
disturb a court's findings of fact when clearly erroneous. 
See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca- 
Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386, 401 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The intent of 
the parties to ambiguous provisions in a contract is, 
however, a question of fact that an appellate court can set 
aside only if it is clearly erroneous."). On the basis of the 
facts presented, we cannot conclude that the District Court 
clearly erred in refusing to credit the Taxpayers' assertions 
that the "payor's intent" in settling the lawsuit was only to 
compensate for personal injuries and not the delay 
damages to which Taxpayers' would be otherwise entitled.19 
 
Having rejected the Taxpayers' assertions on this point, 
we agree that the District Court correctly concluded that 
the IRS's use of a ratio method to determine the portion of 
the settlement allocated to delay damages was correct. 
Taxpayers have not submitted credible evidence that would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. "[B]asic contract principles do indeed apply to settlement 
agreements." In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
19. We find the Tax Court's holding in McShane v. Commissioner, 53 
T.C.M. (CCH) 409, 1987 WL 40219 (1987), to be distinguishable. In that 
case, the jury had awarded personal injury damages, but the trial court 
had not yet added prejudgment interest and entered an enforceable 
judgment when the case was settled. See id. Furthermore, the settlement 
agreement explicitly provided that sums paid were"without costs and 
interest." Id. Thus, in light of the pendency of any prejudgment interest, 
the Tax Court found that the payor's intent was only to compensate 
plaintiffs for their non-taxable personal injury. See id. In this case, 
delay 
damages were added to the jury award in a definite amount and were a 
component of an enforceable judgment that had already been affirmed 
once on appeal. It was thus reasonable for the District Court to find that 
the intentions of the defendants in this case were different from the 
intentions of the defendants in McShane. See Delaney, 99 F.3d at 25 n.4. 
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rebut, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendants' intentions in settling their suit were anything 
other than to avoid the underlying judgment. Because that 
judgment contained both personal injury damages and 
delay damages, the IRS was correct in allocating the 
settlement similarly. 
 
Lastly Taxpayers argue that, if we do not accept their 
argument that no part of the settlement was allocated to 
delay damages, the Government should only tax the 
amount by which the net settlement exceeded the award of 
damages given by the jury.20 We first note that no court has 
adopted this methodology for calculating the taxable 
portion of a settlement recovery.21 The District Court 
dismissed this methodology out of hand, stating"I do not 
find this argument persuasive." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Subtracting the personal injury award ($1,910,000) from the net 
settlement received by the Taxpayers ($2,247,727) yields $337,727, 
which is the amount actually received by the Taxpayers in excess of the 
jury award. 
 
21. Taxpayers assert that this methodology is consistent with that in 
Bagley v. Commissioner, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997). In Bagley, the 
parties settled a defamation suit with a punitive damages component 
after the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 
394. Even though the initial judgment on the remanded claim had been 
for $1 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive 
damages, the parties settled for $1.5 million prior to trial. Id. Though 
the 
IRS had sought to tax a greater amount, the Tax Court found that the 
payor's intent was to minimize the payment of punitive damages, and 
thus allocated $1 million to compensatory defamation damages and 
$500,000 to taxable punitive damages. Id. at 395. The Eighth Circuit 
rejected the taxpayers' argument that none of the damages were for 
punitive damages, even though there was some evidence from 
negotiations in support of that contention. Id.  at 395-96. 
 
While the allocation in Bagley did result in taxation of only that 
amount by which the settlement exceeded the jury's compensatory, non- 
taxable damages, this does not support the Taxpayers in this case 
because the result in Bagley was intended by the settling parties, as 
found by the Tax Court after consideration of all relevant circumstances. 
Id. at 395. In contrast, the Taxpayers have no evidence that any party to 
this underlying litigation intended such an allocation and instead have 
suggested this technique as a normative principle, one to which we do 
not subscribe. 
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Nor do we. The Taxpayers' suggested calculation is 
initially appealing because it would tax as delay damages 
only that amount by which their recovery exceeded the jury 
award. On closer analysis, however, it is apparent that this 
allocation method assumes that, for some inexplicable 
reason, the attorneys' fees were deducted only from the 
delay damages and not in pro rata portions from the 
Taxpayers' recovery as a whole. Not only is this supposition 
untenable, but it would also result in a scheme by which 
the quantity of the judgment that is taxable would turn on 
the amount of attorneys' fees and costs. The anomalous 
result would be that plaintiffs identically situated to the 
Taxpayers but who represented themselves pro se  and 
obtained an identical recovery would pay substantially 
more taxes on their judgment than the Taxpayers in this 
case. There is no reason that the tax incidence of a recovery 
of delay damages should be almost entirely mitigated by 
attorneys' fees and costs deducted from the recovery. 
Calculation of taxes is not a reprise of Jarndyce v. 
Jarndyce, the legendary suit in Charles Dickens' Bleak 
House, in which resolution came about only because legal 
fees ate up the whole of an estate. 
 
Indeed, the inherently rational and fair method to 
disaggregate taxable delay damages from non-taxable 
personal injury damages in a general settlement following a 
judgment containing both, in the absence of persuasive 
evidence supporting a contrary allocation, is the ratio 
method adopted by the IRS and District Court in this case. 
The IRS's allocation accomplishes the purpose ofS 104(a)(2) 
by exempting only those damages received in compromise 
of the personal injury claim while permitting taxation of the 
Rule 238 damages added to the award to compensate the 
plaintiff for delay. We therefore affirm the judgment of the 
District Court awarding summary judgment in favor of the 
Government on the allocation issue. 
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